34 ideas
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
13047 | It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon] |
13065 | Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
6356 | Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Plantinga, by Pollock/Cruz] |
13054 | Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
13067 | For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
13055 | Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
13046 | Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon] |
13058 | Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon] |
13064 | The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon] |
13050 | The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon] |
13059 | Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon] |
13049 | We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon] |
13051 | Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon] |
13053 | A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon] |
13061 | Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon] |
13045 | Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon] |
13062 | Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon] |
13063 | Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon] |
13060 | Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon] |
13056 | Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon] |
13057 | Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |