Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ways of Worldmaking', 'Commentary on the Metaphysics' and 'Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
11193 Understanding begins with the notion of being and essence [Avicenna]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
17651 Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
17652 Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
14775 Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
14776 That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17656 Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
17661 We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
17659 Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
17657 We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
17654 A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
11209 The simple's whatness is its very self [Avicenna]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
11204 The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness [Avicenna]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
15036 An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17653 Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
14770 Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
14774 Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration
14773 A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
14772 If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
14771 Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
17660 Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
17658 Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
17650 We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
17655 Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
14769 Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
17649 If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]