37 ideas
17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |