22 ideas
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
9967 | 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien] |
9968 | A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien] |
9965 | There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien] |
9966 | The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien] |
9962 | How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien] |
9963 | If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien] |
9964 | Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
9969 | The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
11127 | If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |