Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ways of Worldmaking', 'Daniel Dennett on himself' and 'German Philosophy: a very short introduction'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie]
German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie]
Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 1. Biology
Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett]