12 ideas
| 15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
| 18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| 15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
| 16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
| 15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
| 15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
| 15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
| 15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
| 18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
| 16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
| 18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| 8113 | Art is like understanding a natural language, and needs a grasp of a symbol system [Goodman, by Gardner] |