Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ways of Worldmaking', 'Comment on Armstrong and Forrest' and 'Sets and Numbers'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
17651 Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
17652 Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
17824 The master science is physical objects divided into sets [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
17825 Set theory (unlike the Peano postulates) can explain why multiplication is commutative [Maddy]
17826 Standardly, numbers are said to be sets, which is neat ontology and epistemology [Maddy]
17828 Numbers are properties of sets, just as lengths are properties of physical objects [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
17827 Sets exist where their elements are, but numbers are more like universals [Maddy]
17830 Number theory doesn't 'reduce' to set theory, because sets have number properties [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
17823 If mathematical objects exist, how can we know them, and which objects are they? [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
17829 Number words are unusual as adjectives; we don't say 'is five', and numbers always come first [Maddy]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17656 Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
17661 We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
17659 Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
17657 We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
17654 A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
15453 The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15452 We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17653 Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
17660 Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
17658 Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
17650 We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
17655 Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
17649 If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]