28 ideas
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
17499 | Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides] |
17498 | In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG] |
17501 | Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides] |
17502 | The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides] |
17496 | 'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides] |
17497 | Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
17500 | General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |