Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ways of Worldmaking', 'Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori' and 'Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
17651 Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
17652 Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
23623 Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
23624 The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
23625 Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
23628 The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
23627 'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
23626 Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
23621 Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
23622 We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17656 Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
17661 We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
17659 Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
17657 We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
17654 A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14633 How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson]
14635 An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14632 Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17653 Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
14631 How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
17660 Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
17658 Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
17650 We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
17655 Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
17649 If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]