Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Languages of Art', 'Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82' and 'Posterior Analytics'

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113 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Aristotle, by Politis]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle]
An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt]
Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle]
You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
I tell the truth, even if it is repulsive [Nietzsche]
The pain in truth is when it destroys a belief [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
We don't create logic, time and space! The mind obeys laws because they are true [Nietzsche]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
An axiom is a principle which must be understood if one is to learn anything [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Demonstrations by reductio assume excluded middle [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Everything is either asserted or denied truly [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Aristotle's axioms (unlike Euclid's) are assumptions awaiting proof [Aristotle, by Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is concerned with forms, not with superficial properties [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
The essence of a triangle comes from the line, mentioned in any account of triangles [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
A unit is what is quantitatively indivisible [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
To think about being we must have an opinion about what it is [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't? [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
What is necessary cannot be otherwise [Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
For Aristotle knowledge is explanatory, involving understanding, and principles or causes [Aristotle, by Witt]
'Episteme' means grasping causes, universal judgments, explanation, and teaching [Aristotle, by Witt]
The reason why is the key to knowledge [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity [Aristotle]
Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable [Aristotle]
We only understand something when we know its explanation [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
You cannot understand anything through perception [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Aristotle's concepts of understanding and explanation mean he is not a pure empiricist [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Animals may have some knowledge if they retain perception, but understanding requires reasons to be given [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Many memories of the same item form a single experience [Aristotle]
There is no proof that we forget things - only that we can't recall [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes [Aristotle]
There must be definitions before demonstration is possible [Aristotle]
All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties [Aristotle]
Demonstration is more than entailment, as the explanatory order must match the causal order [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi on Aristotle]
Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions [Aristotle]
We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding [Aristotle]
Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself [Aristotle]
Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term [Aristotle]
Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations [Aristotle]
Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions [Aristotle]
Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar [Aristotle]
The principles of demonstrations are definitions [Aristotle]
A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
We learn universals from many particulars [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle]
Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle]
Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation is of the status of a thing, inferences to it, initiation of change, and purpose [Aristotle]
What we seek and understand are facts, reasons, existence, and identity [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Explanation and generality are inseparable [Aristotle, by Wedin]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Universals give better explanations, because they are self-explanatory and primitive [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Our inclinations would not conflict if we were a unity; we imagine unity for our multiplicity [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts [Aristotle]
A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised [Aristotle]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
We contain many minds, which fight for the 'I' of the mind [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thoughts are signs (just as words are) [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Great orators lead their arguments, rather than following them [Nietzsche]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
Negation takes something away from something [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
The pragmatics of language is more comprehensible than the meaning [Nietzsche]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either [Aristotle]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Our motives don't explain our actions [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
People who miss beauty seek the sublime, where even the ugly shows its 'beauty' [Nietzsche]
The sublimity of nature which dwarfs us was a human creation [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 5. Art as Language
Art is like understanding a natural language, and needs a grasp of a symbol system [Goodman, by Gardner]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We can aspire to greatness by creating new functions for ourselves [Nietzsche]
Greeks might see modern analysis of what is human as impious [Nietzsche]
Once a drive controls the intellect, it rules, and sets the goals [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
We always assign values, but we may not value those values [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Humans are vividly aware of short-term effects, and almost ignorant of the long-term ones [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is the active equilibrium of our drives [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
Some things we would never do, even for the highest ideals [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
You should not want too many virtues; one is enough [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Talk of 'utility' presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
The goal is to settle human beings, like other animals, but humans are still changeable [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
My eternal recurrence is opposed to feeling fragmented and imperfect [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
See our present lives as eternal! Religions see it as fleeting, and aim at some different life [Nietzsche]
The eternal return of wastefulness is a terrible thought [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Justice says people are not equal, and should become increasingly unequal [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Reasons that justify punishment can also justify the crime [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Do away with punishment. Counter-retribution is as bad as the crime [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
If you don't want war, remove your borders; but you set up borders because you want war [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
Our growth is too subtle to perceive, and long events are too slow for us to grasp [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Unlike time, space is subjective. Empty space was assumed, but it doesn't exist [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Life is forces conjoined by nutrition, to produce resistance, arrangement and value [Nietzsche]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
Properties must be proved, but not essence; but existents are not a kind, so existence isn't part of essence [Aristotle]