Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ways of Worldmaking', 'On the Genealogy of Morals' and 'Scientific Essentialism'

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75 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
The main aim of philosophy must be to determine the order of rank among values [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science [Ellis]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Scientific knowledge is nothing without a prior philosophical 'faith' [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Objectivity is not disinterestedness (impossible), but the ability to switch perspectives [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
Only that which has no history is definable [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Psychologists should be brave and proud, and prefer truth to desires, even when it is ugly [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind [Ellis]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic [Ellis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis]
The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do [Ellis]
Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis]
Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis]
Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals [Ellis]
Universals are all types of natural kind [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists [Ellis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Philosophers have never asked why there is a will to truth in the first place [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Forgetfulness is a strong positive ability, not mental laziness [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
There is only 'perspective' seeing and knowing, and so the best objectivity is multiple points of view [Nietzsche]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved [Ellis]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
Good explanations unify [Ellis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures [Ellis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds [Ellis]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential [Ellis]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Philosophers invented "free will" so that our virtues would be permanently interesting to the gods [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
People who think in words are orators rather than thinkers, and think about facts instead of thinking facts [Nietzsche]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
It is a delusion to separate the man from the deed, like the flash from the lightning [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
We must question the very value of moral values [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
The concept of 'good' was created by aristocrats to describe their own actions [Nietzsche]
A strong rounded person soon forgets enemies, misfortunes, and even misdeeds [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
All animals strive for the ideal conditions to express their power, and hate any hindrances [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Nietzsche rejects impersonal morality, and asserts the idea of living well [Nietzsche, by Nagel]
Only the decline of aristocratic morality led to concerns about "egoism" [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Basic justice is the negotiation of agreement among equals, and the imposition of agreement [Nietzsche]
A masterful and violent person need have nothing to do with contracts [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Plato, Spinoza and Kant are very different, but united in their low estimation of pity [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Guilt and obligation originated in the relationship of buying and selling, credit and debt [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
If we say birds of prey could become lambs, that makes them responsible for being birds of prey [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Modern nihilism is now feeling tired of mankind [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Old tribes always felt an obligation to the earlier generations, and the founders [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / b. Natural authority
The state begins with brutal conquest of a disorganised people, not with a 'contract' [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
Punishment makes people harder, more alienated, and hostile [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton [Ellis]
What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds [Ellis]
Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) [Ellis]
The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
The truly great haters in world history have always been priests [Nietzsche]