Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ways of Worldmaking', 'The Causal Theory of Names' and 'The Conquest of Happiness'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


27 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life [Russell]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power [Russell]
Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening [Russell]
Boredom always involves not being fully occupied [Russell]
Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]