Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ways of Worldmaking', 'On Sufficient Reason' and 'Maths as a Science of Patterns'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason [Leibniz]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Axioms are often affirmed simply because they produce results which have been accepted [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematical realism says that maths exists, is largely true, and is independent of proofs [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Mathematical constants and quantifiers only exist as locations within structures or patterns [Resnik]
Sets are positions in patterns [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
Structuralism must explain why a triangle is a whole, and not a random set of points [Resnik]
There are too many mathematical objects for them all to be mental or physical [Resnik]
Maths is pattern recognition and representation, and its truth and proofs are based on these [Resnik]
Congruence is the strongest relationship of patterns, equivalence comes next, and mutual occurrence is the weakest [Resnik]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz]