Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ways of Worldmaking', 'On Wisdom' and 'Anti-essentialism'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is knowing all of the sciences, and their application [Leibniz]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Perfect knowledge implies complete explanations and perfect prediction [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]