44 ideas
21634 | Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber] |
21666 | 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber] |
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
21640 | 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber] |
21657 | Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber] |
21653 | Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber] |
21636 | 'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber] |
21637 | If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber] |
21643 | The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber] |
21644 | Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber] |
21646 | The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber] |
21665 | The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber] |
21649 | How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber] |
21647 | Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber] |
21648 | Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
21664 | Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
21660 | Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
21661 | There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
21652 | Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
21663 | Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
21654 | The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber] |
21641 | Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber] |
21638 | Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber] |
21658 | Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber] |
21659 | 'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber] |
21655 | Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber] |
21656 | Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber] |
21635 | Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber] |
21662 | Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber] |
21645 | 'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber] |
21639 | 'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |
22908 | When one element contains the grounds of the other, the first one is prior in time [Leibniz] |