14 ideas
12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
13373 | Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G] |
13368 | The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G] |
13370 | 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G] |
13369 | By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G] |
13366 | The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G] |
13367 | The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G] |
13371 | If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G] |
13372 | There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G] |
14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
14665 | We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses [Boethius] |
18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |