21 ideas
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
22241 | Don't fear god or worry about death; the good is easily got and the terrible easily cured [Philodemus] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |