Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ways of Worldmaking', 'The Nature of Mental States' and 'Explanation and Reference'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
17651 Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
17652 Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
17505 Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17656 Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
17661 We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
17659 Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
17657 We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
17654 A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11908 Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17653 Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
17660 Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
17508 Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
17658 Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
17650 We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
17655 Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2590 Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2591 Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2592 Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
2589 Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
2588 Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2587 Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
6376 Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
2330 If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
17506 I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
17649 If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
17507 Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam]
11904 Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P]