36 ideas
| 19066 | Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett] |
| 17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
| 12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
| 19067 | A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett] |
| 17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
| 19060 | Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett] |
| 11066 | Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna] |
| 19058 | Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett] |
| 19063 | Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett] |
| 19059 | In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett] |
| 19062 | Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett] |
| 19065 | Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett] |
| 12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
| 17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
| 17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
| 17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
| 17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
| 17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
| 12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
| 17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
| 12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
| 17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
| 17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
| 17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
| 17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
| 19061 | An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett] |
| 12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
| 6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
| 12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
| 12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
| 12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
| 12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
| 12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
| 19064 | Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett] |
| 12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
| 17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |