55 ideas
2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |
5974 | People report seeing through rocks, or over the horizon, or impossibly small works [Plutarch] |