39 ideas
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
17377 | All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré] |
17376 | We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
17390 | Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré] |
17389 | A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré] |
17388 | It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré] |
18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
17374 | The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
17378 | Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |
17381 | Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré] |
17385 | Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré] |
17375 | Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré] |
17379 | Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré] |
17384 | Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré] |
17387 | Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré] |
17382 | Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré] |
17380 | Wales may count as fish [Dupré] |
18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |
17383 | Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré] |
17386 | The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré] |