Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ways of Worldmaking', 'Without Immediate Justification' and 'The Powers Metaphysics'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Reductive analysis makes a concept clearer, by giving an alternative simpler set [Williams,NE]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Promoting an ontology by its implied good metaphysic is an 'argument-by-display' [Williams,NE]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Change exists, it is causal, and it needs an explanation [Williams,NE]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Processes don't begin or end; they just change direction unexpectedly [Williams,NE]
Processes are either strings of short unchanging states, or continuous and unreducible events [Williams,NE]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
The status quo is part of what exists, and so needs metaphysical explanation [Williams,NE]
A metaphysic is a set of wider explanations derived from a basic ontology [Williams,NE]
Humeans say properties are passive, possibility is vast, laws are descriptions, causation is weak [Williams,NE]
We shouldn't posit the existence of anything we have a word for [Williams,NE]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers are 'multi-track' if they can produce a variety of manifestations [Williams,NE]
Every possible state of affairs is written into its originating powers [Williams,NE]
Naming powers is unwise, because that it usually done by a single manifestation [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Fundamental physics describes everything in terms of powers [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Rather than pure powers or pure categoricals, I favour basics which are both at once [Williams,NE]
Powers are more complicated than properties which are always on display [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
There are basic powers, which underlie dispositions, potentialities, capacities etc [Williams,NE]
Dispositions are just useful descriptions, which are explained by underlying powers [Williams,NE]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
If objects are property bundles, the properties need combining powers [Williams,NE]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-Dimensional is Perdurantism (temporal parts), plus Eternalism [Williams,NE]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causation needs to explain stasis, as well as change [Williams,NE]
Causation is the exercise of powers [Williams,NE]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
If causes and effects overlap, that makes changes impossible [Williams,NE]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Powers contain lawlike features, pointing to possible future states [Williams,NE]