19 ideas
| 10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
| 17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
| 10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
| 10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
| 17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
| 19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 10190 | From the axiomatic point of view, mathematics is a storehouse of abstract structures [Bourbaki] |
| 17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
| 17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
| 17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
| 17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
| 17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
| 17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
| 17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
| 17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
| 17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
| 17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
| 10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
| 17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |