51 ideas
| 21844 | The history of philosophy is an agent of power: how can you think if you haven't read the great names? [Deleuze] |
| 21849 | Thought should be thrown like a stone from a war-machine [Deleuze] |
| 21845 | Philosophy aims to become the official language, supporting orthodoxy and the state [Deleuze] |
| 17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
| 21839 | When I meet objections I just move on; they never contribute anything [Deleuze] |
| 21841 | We must create new words, and treat them as normal, and as if designating real things. [Deleuze] |
| 21842 | Don't assess ideas for truth or justice; look for another idea, and establish a relationship with it [Deleuze] |
| 21850 | Dualisms can be undone from within, by tracing connections, and drawing them to a new path [Deleuze] |
| 17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
| 21838 | Before we seek solutions, it is important to invent problems [Deleuze] |
| 21847 | Before Being there is politics [Deleuze] |
| 17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
| 17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
| 17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
| 17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
| 17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
| 17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
| 2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
| 2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
| 2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
| 2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
| 2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
| 2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
| 2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
| 2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
| 2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
| 2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
| 2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
| 2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
| 2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
| 2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
| 2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
| 2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
| 2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
| 2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
| 2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
| 17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
| 2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
| 2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
| 2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
| 2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
| 2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
| 2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
| 17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
| 17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
| 17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
| 21840 | A meeting of man and animal can be deterritorialization (like a wasp with an orchid) [Deleuze] |
| 2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
| 21843 | People consist of many undetermined lines, some rigid, some supple, some 'lines of flight' [Deleuze] |
| 21848 | Some lines (of flight) are becomings which escape the system [Deleuze] |
| 17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |