67 ideas
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
15413 | With four tense operators, all complex tenses reduce to fourteen basic cases [Burgess] |
15415 | The temporal Barcan formulas fix what exists, which seems absurd [Burgess] |
15430 | Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess] |
15431 | It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess] |
15429 | Relevance logic's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason' [Burgess] |
15404 | Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess] |
15405 | Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess] |
15427 | The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess] |
15421 | Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess] |
15403 | Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess] |
15407 | Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess] |
15424 | Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess] |
15409 | All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess] |
15414 | The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess] |
15406 | 'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess] |
15425 | The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess] |
15426 | We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess] |
15408 | 'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess] |
15418 | Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess] |
15412 | Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess] |
15411 | We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess] |
15416 | We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess] |
15428 | The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
15420 | De re modality seems to apply to objects a concept intended for sentences [Burgess] |
15419 | General consensus is S5 for logical modality of validity, and S4 for proof [Burgess] |
15417 | Logical necessity has two sides - validity and demonstrability - which coincide in classical logic [Burgess] |
2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
15423 | It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess] |
15422 | Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess] |
2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |