34 ideas
13939 | No possible evidence could decide the reality of numbers, so it is a pseudo-question [Carnap] |
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
10638 | A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo] |
10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
8748 | Logical positivists incorporated geometry into logicism, saying axioms are just definitions [Carnap, by Shapiro] |
13936 | Questions about numbers are answered by analysis, and are analytic, and hence logically true [Carnap] |
8960 | Internal questions about abstractions are trivial, and external ones deeply problematic [Carnap, by Szabó] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
13933 | Existence questions are 'internal' (within a framework) or 'external' (concerning the whole framework) [Carnap] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
13934 | To be 'real' is to be an element of a system, so we cannot ask reality questions about the system itself [Carnap] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
13938 | A linguistic framework involves commitment to entities, so only commitment to the framework is in question [Carnap] |
10643 | We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo] |
10637 | Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
13935 | We only accept 'things' within a language with formation, testing and acceptance rules [Carnap] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
13932 | Empiricists tend to reject abstract entities, and to feel sympathy with nominalism [Carnap] |
13937 | New linguistic claims about entities are not true or false, but just expedient, fruitful or successful [Carnap] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
13940 | All linguistic forms in science are merely judged by their efficiency as instruments [Carnap] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
10634 | Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |