37 ideas
| 19275 | You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale] |
| 17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
| 19291 | A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale] |
| 17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
| 19297 | The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale] |
| 19301 | With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale] |
| 19296 | If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale] |
| 19289 | Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale] |
| 19298 | Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale] |
| 19295 | Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale] |
| 17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
| 19281 | Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale] |
| 17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
| 17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
| 17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
| 19278 | There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale] |
| 17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
| 19302 | If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale] |
| 17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
| 19290 | Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale] |
| 19286 | 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale] |
| 19288 | Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale] |
| 19285 | Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale] |
| 19287 | Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale] |
| 19282 | It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale] |
| 19276 | The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale] |
| 19293 | Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale] |
| 19294 | If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale] |
| 19279 | What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale] |
| 19299 | Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale] |
| 17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
| 17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
| 17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
| 17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
| 19300 | The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale] |
| 23801 | Biosemantics says content is useful mapping from a producer to a consumer system [Millikan, by Schulte] |
| 17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |