80 ideas
| 1887 | You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 13395 | If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien] |
| 17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
| 1885 | Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
| 13378 | It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien] |
| 12196 | A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 13402 | We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien] |
| 13405 | The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien] |
| 13399 | Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien] |
| 13398 | We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien] |
| 13392 | Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien] |
| 1902 | Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 13404 | To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien] |
| 17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
| 17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
| 13386 | If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien] |
| 17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
| 17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
| 13403 | The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien] |
| 17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
| 13375 | The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien] |
| 13393 | Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien] |
| 13388 | It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien] |
| 13384 | Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien] |
| 13385 | Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien] |
| 13383 | If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien] |
| 13400 | If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien] |
| 13401 | The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien] |
| 13380 | Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien] |
| 13376 | We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien] |
| 13381 | Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien] |
| 13382 | Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien] |
| 17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
| 13379 | If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien] |
| 13394 | Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien] |
| 13391 | Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien] |
| 13374 | To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien] |
| 13389 | The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien] |
| 13390 | Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien] |
| 1889 | If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1883 | How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1890 | We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
| 1870 | The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1882 | The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1881 | The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1872 | The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1873 | If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1874 | How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1878 | Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1880 | Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1877 | If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1879 | Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1876 | If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1911 | Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1910 | With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
| 17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
| 1886 | If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
| 13396 | Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien] |
| 1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 13377 | First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien] |
| 17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |
| 1894 | Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1897 | Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1898 | Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1896 | If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1895 | Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1900 | If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1899 | Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1901 | If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1903 | If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1904 | Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1905 | How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1891 | How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1892 | The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1893 | If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus] |