Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed)', 'An Introduction to Hegel' and 'Propositions'

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11 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
The moral will is self-determining, but the ethical will is met in society [Houlgate]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]