30 ideas
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
19682 | Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew] |
19687 | Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew] |
19684 | Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew] |
19688 | Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew] |
19686 | Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew] |
19680 | Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew] |
19681 | If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew] |
19689 | Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew] |
19683 | Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |
19685 | Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |