27 ideas
| 11103 | We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine] |
| 17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
| 17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
| 11092 | A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine] |
| 17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
| 17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
| 11093 | We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine] |
| 17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
| 17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
| 14742 | It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N] |
| 11101 | General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine] |
| 11096 | Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine] |
| 17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
| 11099 | Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine] |
| 11094 | 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine] |
| 11097 | Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine] |
| 17595 | To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine] |
| 17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
| 11095 | We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine] |
| 17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
| 17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
| 17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
| 17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
| 11104 | Concepts are language [Quine] |
| 11102 | Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine] |
| 18885 | Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N] |
| 17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |