37 ideas
7623 | For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam] |
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
22708 | Good reasons must give way to better [Shakespeare] |
4714 | Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
7617 | Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam] |
4716 | The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
7616 | Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam] |
14203 | Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam] |
14207 | If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
14214 | If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis] |
14205 | The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
7610 | A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
7618 | Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
4718 | If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
7620 | Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
14204 | Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
7611 | Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam] |
14200 | 'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam] |
7612 | Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam] |
7613 | Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam] |
14202 | Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam] |
14201 | Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam] |
14206 | There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam] |
20304 | The cause of my action is in my will [Shakespeare] |
7624 | The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |