98 ideas
| 16241 | The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics [Maudlin] |
| 16257 | Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin] |
| 16276 | Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies [Maudlin] |
| 16244 | If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray [Maudlin] |
| 16255 | The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes [Maudlin] |
| 9542 | The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell, with four axioms and two rules [Russell/Whitehead, by Hughes/Cresswell] |
| 21720 | Russell saw Reducibility as legitimate for reducing classes to logic [Linsky,B on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 10044 | Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| 18208 | We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead] |
| 8204 | Lewis's 'strict implication' preserved Russell's confusion of 'if...then' with implication [Quine on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 9359 | Russell's implication means that random sentences imply one another [Lewis,CI on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 21707 | Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
| 10036 | In 'Principia' a new abstract theory of relations appeared, and was applied [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
| 18248 | A real number is the class of rationals less than the number [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| 18152 | Russell takes numbers to be classes, but then reduces the classes to numerical quantifiers [Russell/Whitehead, by Bostock] |
| 10025 | Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Hodes] |
| 8683 | Russell and Whitehead were not realists, but embraced nearly all of maths in logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
| 10037 | 'Principia' lacks a precise statement of the syntax [Gödel on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 10093 | The ramified theory of types used propositional functions, and covered bound variables [Russell/Whitehead, by George/Velleman] |
| 8691 | The Russell/Whitehead type theory was limited, and was not really logic [Friend on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 10305 | In 'Principia Mathematica', logic is exceeded in the axioms of infinity and reducibility, and in the domains [Bernays on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 8684 | Russell and Whitehead consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
| 8746 | To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| 16243 | The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics [Maudlin] |
| 16271 | Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is [Maudlin] |
| 16273 | If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure [Maudlin] |
| 16275 | The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter' [Maudlin] |
| 16258 | To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true [Maudlin] |
| 16259 | Naďve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin] |
| 16253 | A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin] |
| 16263 | Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin] |
| 16260 | Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin] |
| 12033 | An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM] |
| 16277 | Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible [Maudlin] |
| 16249 | A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin] |
| 10040 | Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
| 16254 | Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely [Maudlin] |
| 16245 | Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them [Maudlin] |
| 21725 | The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
| 23474 | A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead] |
| 23455 | The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead] |
| 23480 | The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 18275 | Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead] |
| 23453 | Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead] |
| 16248 | Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin] |
| 16250 | We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin] |
| 16268 | The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin] |
| 16267 | If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin] |
| 16269 | If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin] |
| 16247 | Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws [Maudlin] |
| 16272 | Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state [Maudlin] |
| 16242 | Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis [Maudlin] |
| 16251 | 'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind [Maudlin] |
| 16270 | If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws [Maudlin] |
| 21167 | Gravity is unusual, in that it always attracts and never repels [New Sci.] |
| 21176 | In the Big Bang general relativity fails, because gravity is too powerful [New Sci.] |
| 21147 | Quantum electrodynamics incorporates special relativity and quantum mechanics [New Sci.] |
| 21155 | Photons have zero rest mass, so virtual photons have infinite range [New Sci.] |
| 21161 | In the standard model all the fundamental force fields merge at extremely high energies [New Sci.] |
| 21146 | Electrons move fast, so are subject to special relativity [New Sci.] |
| 21148 | The strong force is repulsive at short distances, strong at medium, and fades at long [New Sci.] |
| 21151 | Gluons, the particles carrying the strong force, interact because of their colour charge [New Sci.] |
| 21152 | The strong force binds quarks tight, and the nucleus more weakly [New Sci.] |
| 21143 | Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ˝ or with spin 3/2 [New Sci.] |
| 21142 | Classifying hadrons revealed two symmetry patterns, produced by three basic elements [New Sci.] |
| 21150 | Three different colours of quark (as in the proton) can cancel out to give no colour [New Sci.] |
| 21145 | The four fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, weak and strong) are the effects of particles [New Sci.] |
| 21153 | The weak force explains beta decay, and the change of type by quarks and leptons [New Sci.] |
| 21154 | Three particles enable the weak force: W+ and W- are charged, and Z° is not [New Sci.] |
| 21156 | The weak force particles are heavy, so the force has a short range [New Sci.] |
| 21164 | Why do the charges of the very different proton and electron perfectly match up? [New Sci.] |
| 21170 | The Standard Model cannot explain dark energy, survival of matter, gravity, or force strength [New Sci.] |
| 21140 | Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum [New Sci.] |
| 21149 | Quarks have red, green or blue colour charge (akin to electric charge) [New Sci.] |
| 21158 | Fermions, with spin ˝, are antisocial, and cannot share quantum states [New Sci.] |
| 21165 | Spin is akin to rotation, and is easily measured in a magnetic field [New Sci.] |
| 21157 | Particles are spread out, with wave-like properties, and higher energy shortens the wavelength [New Sci.] |
| 21163 | The mass of protons and neutrinos is mostly binding energy, not the quarks [New Sci.] |
| 21168 | Gravitional mass turns out to be the same as inertial mass [New Sci.] |
| 21138 | Neutrons are slightly heavier than protons, and decay into them by emitting an electron [New Sci.] |
| 21144 | Top, bottom, charm and strange quarks quickly decay into up and down [New Sci.] |
| 21141 | Neutrinos were proposed as the missing energy in neutron beta decay [New Sci.] |
| 21169 | Only neutrinos spin anticlockwise [New Sci.] |
| 21166 | Standard antineutrinos have opposite spin and opposite lepton number [New Sci.] |
| 21171 | The symmetry of unified electromagnetic and weak forces was broken by the Higgs field [New Sci.] |
| 21179 | Supersymmetric string theory can be expressed using loop quantum gravity [New Sci.] |
| 21178 | String theory is now part of 11-dimensional M-Theory, involving p-branes [New Sci.] |
| 21175 | String theory might be tested by colliding strings to make bigger 'stringballs' [New Sci.] |
| 21177 | String theory offers a quantum theory of gravity, by describing the graviton [New Sci.] |
| 21162 | Only supersymmetry offers to incorporate gravity into the scheme [New Sci.] |
| 21173 | Supersymmetry says particles and superpartners were unities, but then split [New Sci.] |
| 21159 | Supersymmetry has extra heavy bosons and heavy fermions [New Sci.] |
| 21172 | The evidence for supersymmetry keeps failing to appear [New Sci.] |
| 21160 | The Higgs field means even low energy space is not empty [New Sci.] |
| 16264 | I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world [Maudlin] |
| 16265 | If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second [Maudlin] |
| 16266 | There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is [Maudlin] |
| 21174 | Dark matter must have mass, to produce gravity, and no electric charge, to not reflect light [New Sci.] |