80 ideas
| 15357 | Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten] |
| 15352 | A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten] |
| 15324 | Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten] |
| 15323 | Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten] |
| 15374 | Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten] |
| 15348 | Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten] |
| 15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
| 15337 | The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten] |
| 15334 | The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten] |
| 15336 | The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten] |
| 15354 | Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten] |
| 15340 | Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten] |
| 15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
| 15373 | Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten] |
| 15346 | Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten] |
| 15371 | An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten] |
| 15332 | 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten] |
| 15361 | A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten] |
| 15350 | The Naïve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten] |
| 15351 | Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten] |
| 15367 | By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten] |
| 15330 | Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
| 15331 | Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
| 15325 | Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten] |
| 15344 | Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten] |
| 15356 | Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten] |
| 15368 | This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten] |
| 15358 | Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten] |
| 15359 | Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten] |
| 15329 | Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten] |
| 15326 | Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten] |
| 15341 | Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten] |
| 15328 | A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten] |
| 15349 | It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten] |
| 15366 | Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten] |
| 15353 | The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten] |
| 15355 | Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten] |
| 15364 | English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten] |
| 15360 | ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten] |
| 15369 | Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten] |
| 15370 | Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten] |
| 19482 | Current physics says matter and antimatter should have reduced to light at the big bang [New Sci.] |
| 19483 | CP violation shows a decay imbalance in matter and antimatter, leading to matter's dominance [New Sci.] |
| 15338 | We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten] |
| 15363 | In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten] |
| 15362 | If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten] |
| 2526 | Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett] |
| 15372 | Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten] |
| 2523 | That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett] |
| 19737 | A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.] |
| 2528 | Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett] |
| 2525 | Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett] |
| 2527 | Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett] |
| 19736 | Neural networks can extract the car-ness of a car, or the chair-ness of a chair [New Sci.] |
| 2530 | Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett] |
| 16419 | No one has yet devised a rationality test [New Sci.] |
| 16417 | About a third of variation in human intelligence is environmental [New Sci.] |
| 16418 | People can be highly intelligent, yet very stupid [New Sci.] |
| 19484 | Psychologists measure personality along five dimensions [New Sci.] |
| 2524 | A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett] |
| 2529 | Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett] |
| 15347 | A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten] |
| 19950 | Entropy is the only time-asymmetric law, so time may be linked to entropy [New Sci.] |
| 19478 | Light moves at a constant space-time speed, but its direction is in neither space nor time [New Sci.] |
| 19474 | Quantum states are measured by external time, of unknown origin [New Sci.] |
| 19473 | The Schrödinger equation describes the evolution of an object's wave function in Hilbert space [New Sci.] |
| 19953 | In string theory space-time has a grainy indivisible substructure [New Sci.] |
| 19954 | It is impossible for find a model of actuality among the innumerable models in string theory [New Sci.] |
| 19476 | String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions [New Sci.] |
| 19947 | Hilbert Space is an abstraction representing all possible states of a quantum system [New Sci.] |
| 19948 | Einstein's merging of time with space has left us confused about the nature of time [New Sci.] |
| 19475 | Relativity makes time and space jointly basic; quantum theory splits them, and prioritises time [New Sci.] |
| 19955 | Space-time may be a geometrical manifestation of quantum entanglement [New Sci.] |
| 19949 | Quantum theory relies on a clock outside the system - but where is it located? [New Sci.] |
| 19951 | Entropy is puzzling, so we may need to build new laws which include time directionality [New Sci.] |
| 19477 | General relativity predicts black holes, as former massive stars, and as galaxy centres [New Sci.] |
| 19952 | Black holes have entropy, but general relativity says they are unstructured, and lack entropy [New Sci.] |
| 16420 | 84.5 percent of the universe is made of dark matter [New Sci.] |
| 17604 | We are halfway to synthesising any molecule we want [New Sci.] |
| 17603 | Chemistry just needs the periodic table, and protons, electrons and neutrinos [New Sci.] |