95 ideas
| 9414 | Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford] |
| 16414 | Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber] |
| 8282 | Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe] |
| 16127 | Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe] |
| 8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe] |
| 8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
| 8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
| 8309 | A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe] |
| 8322 | I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 8312 | It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe] |
| 8297 | Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe] |
| 8266 | Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe] |
| 8302 | Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe] |
| 8298 | Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe] |
| 8311 | If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe] |
| 8310 | Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe] |
| 8321 | All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe] |
| 19482 | Current physics says matter and antimatter should have reduced to light at the big bang [New Sci.] |
| 19483 | CP violation shows a decay imbalance in matter and antimatter, leading to matter's dominance [New Sci.] |
| 8300 | Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe] |
| 8281 | Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe] |
| 8270 | Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe] |
| 8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe] |
| 8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe] |
| 8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe] |
| 8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe] |
| 8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe] |
| 8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe] |
| 8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe] |
| 8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe] |
| 8283 | Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe] |
| 8284 | The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe] |
| 13122 | Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff] |
| 3291 | Emergent properties appear at high levels of complexity, but aren't explainable by the lower levels [Nagel] |
| 8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe] |
| 8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe] |
| 8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe] |
| 8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe] |
| 8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe] |
| 8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe] |
| 8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
| 8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe] |
| 8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
| 16130 | To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 8265 | Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe] |
| 8275 | Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe] |
| 8267 | Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe] |
| 8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 8268 | Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe] |
| 8303 | Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe] |
| 8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe] |
| 8291 | Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe] |
| 16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe] |
| 8279 | The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe] |
| 8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe] |
| 8272 | How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe] |
| 8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe] |
| 8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
| 15079 | 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe] |
| 16063 | Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 8260 | Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe] |
| 16131 | The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe] |
| 8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe] |
| 8280 | While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe] |
| 8276 | Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe] |
| 19737 | A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.] |
| 19736 | Neural networks can extract the car-ness of a car, or the chair-ness of a chair [New Sci.] |
| 8289 | The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe] |
| 16419 | No one has yet devised a rationality test [New Sci.] |
| 16417 | About a third of variation in human intelligence is environmental [New Sci.] |
| 16418 | People can be highly intelligent, yet very stupid [New Sci.] |
| 19484 | Psychologists measure personality along five dimensions [New Sci.] |
| 8299 | Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe] |
| 8306 | You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe] |
| 8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe] |
| 3290 | Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat [Nagel] |
| 19950 | Entropy is the only time-asymmetric law, so time may be linked to entropy [New Sci.] |
| 19478 | Light moves at a constant space-time speed, but its direction is in neither space nor time [New Sci.] |
| 19474 | Quantum states are measured by external time, of unknown origin [New Sci.] |
| 19473 | The Schrödinger equation describes the evolution of an object's wave function in Hilbert space [New Sci.] |
| 19953 | In string theory space-time has a grainy indivisible substructure [New Sci.] |
| 19476 | String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions [New Sci.] |
| 19954 | It is impossible for find a model of actuality among the innumerable models in string theory [New Sci.] |
| 19947 | Hilbert Space is an abstraction representing all possible states of a quantum system [New Sci.] |
| 8269 | Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe] |
| 19955 | Space-time may be a geometrical manifestation of quantum entanglement [New Sci.] |
| 19948 | Einstein's merging of time with space has left us confused about the nature of time [New Sci.] |
| 19475 | Relativity makes time and space jointly basic; quantum theory splits them, and prioritises time [New Sci.] |
| 19949 | Quantum theory relies on a clock outside the system - but where is it located? [New Sci.] |
| 19951 | Entropy is puzzling, so we may need to build new laws which include time directionality [New Sci.] |
| 19477 | General relativity predicts black holes, as former massive stars, and as galaxy centres [New Sci.] |
| 19952 | Black holes have entropy, but general relativity says they are unstructured, and lack entropy [New Sci.] |
| 16420 | 84.5 percent of the universe is made of dark matter [New Sci.] |
| 17604 | We are halfway to synthesising any molecule we want [New Sci.] |
| 17603 | Chemistry just needs the periodic table, and protons, electrons and neutrinos [New Sci.] |