Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz', 'A Dictionary of Philosophy' and 'Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism'

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12 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
14775 Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
14776 That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
7566 The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
14770 Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
14774 Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
6455 Maybe 'sense-data' just help us to talk about unusual perceptual situations [Lacey]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
6454 Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey]
6453 Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration
14773 A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
14772 If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
14771 Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
14769 Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]