Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz', 'Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr)' and 'Matters of Mind'

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Unobservant thinkers tend to dogmatise using insufficient facts [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
Infinity is only potential, never actual [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle]
A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle]
If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'? [Aristotle]
Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing [Aristotle]
The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be [Aristotle]
If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon]
Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form [Aristotle]
The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible [Aristotle]
Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division? [Aristotle]
Bodies are endlessly divisible [Aristotle]
If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing? [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
There is no time without movement [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago? [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Being is better than not-being [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
An Order controls all things [Aristotle]