Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz', 'The Source of Necessity' and 'works'

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12 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
10153 In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
19141 Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10048 There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10694 Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall]
10479 Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
10157 Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
7566 The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12432 Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale]
12434 Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale]
12435 The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
12433 If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
12436 Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale]