Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz', 'The Raft and the Pyramid' and 'The Folly of Trying to Define Truth'

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12 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa]
Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa]