12 ideas
8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
7566 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley] |
8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |