17 ideas
| 6405 | Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling] |
| 11103 | We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine] |
| 7527 | Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk] |
| 11092 | A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine] |
| 11093 | We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine] |
| 11101 | General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine] |
| 11096 | Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine] |
| 11099 | Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine] |
| 11094 | 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine] |
| 11097 | Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine] |
| 17595 | To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine] |
| 11095 | We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine] |
| 7566 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley] |
| 11104 | Concepts are language [Quine] |
| 11102 | Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine] |
| 22302 | Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter] |
| 7526 | Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk] |