27 ideas
23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
7566 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley] |
8353 | Freedom involves acting according to an idea [Anscombe] |
8352 | To believe in determinism, one must believe in a system which determines events [Anscombe] |
23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
8351 | With diseases we easily trace a cause from an effect, but we cannot predict effects [Anscombe] |
4777 | The word 'cause' is an abstraction from a group of causal terms in a language (scrape, push..) [Anscombe] |
10363 | Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe, by Schaffer,J] |
8350 | Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe] |