9 ideas
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
21697 | The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [Quine] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
21698 | All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic [Quine] |
21696 | Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes) [Quine] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
7566 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley] |