18 ideas
| 15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
| 15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
| 15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
| 15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
| 15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
| 15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
| 18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
| 15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
| 15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
| 5500 | Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan] |
| 15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
| 5494 | 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan] |
| 7566 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is really the same as the verification principle [Jolley] |
| 15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
| 5496 | Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan] |
| 5499 | A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan] |
| 5501 | People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan] |
| 15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |