12 ideas
| 8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
| 16669 | Everything that exists is either a being, or some mode of a being [Malebranche] |
| 8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
| 8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
| 8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
| 12432 | Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale] |
| 12434 | Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale] |
| 12435 | The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale] |
| 12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
| 12436 | Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale] |
| 8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |
| 12726 | In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche] |