13 ideas
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
16730 | If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi] |
16669 | Everything that exists is either a being, or some mode of a being [Malebranche] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
16619 | We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi] |
16593 | Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi] |
16729 | How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
12726 | In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche] |