Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Search After Truth', 'Subjective and Objective' and 'Mental Events'

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20 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Everything that exists is either a being, or some mode of a being [Malebranche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin]
Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche]