19 ideas
16669 | Everything that exists is either a being, or some mode of a being [Malebranche] |
14508 | A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM] |
14511 | There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity [Adams,RM] |
12031 | Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM] |
12034 | If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM] |
14510 | Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM] |
16455 | Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM] |
14507 | Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM] |
11964 | Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar] |
16451 | Adams says anti-haecceitism reduces all thisness to suchness [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker] |
11901 | Haecceitism may or may not involve some logical connection to essence [Adams,RM, by Mackie,P] |
14512 | Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM] |
3296 | Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel] |
3295 | Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel] |
3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel] |
3292 | The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel] |
12032 | Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM] |
3294 | As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel] |
12726 | In a true cause we see a necessary connection [Malebranche] |