Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Chomsky on himself', 'Intro to Positive Philosophy' and 'Mental Content'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
12104 All ideas must be understood historically [Comte]
12105 Our knowledge starts in theology, passes through metaphysics, and ends in positivism [Comte]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
12112 Metaphysics is just the oversubtle qualification of abstract names for phenomena [Comte]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
12106 Positivism gives up absolute truth, and seeks phenomenal laws, by reason and observation [Comte]
12111 Positivism is the final state of human intelligence [Comte]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
12114 Science can drown in detail, so we need broad scientists (to keep out the metaphysicians) [Comte]
12116 Only positivist philosophy can terminate modern social crises [Comte]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
12108 All real knowledge rests on observed facts [Comte]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
12109 We must observe in order to form theories, but connected observations need prior theories [Comte]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
23805 Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
12107 Positivism explains facts by connecting particular phenomena with general facts [Comte]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
12115 Introspection is pure illusion; we can obviously observe everything except ourselves [Comte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
23792 Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte]
23795 Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte]
23804 Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte]
23806 Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
23793 On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte]
23796 Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
23802 Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
23797 Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
23799 Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte]
23800 Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
23798 Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
6649 Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
12113 The search for first or final causes is futile [Comte]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
12110 We can never know origins, purposes or inner natures [Comte]