Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Chomsky on himself', 'Infinitism not solution to regress problem' and 'The Concept of Mind'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
18005 Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
14297 A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
14300 No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
8836 Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet]
8837 Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
2622 Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
1353 Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle]
1354 We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
2624 I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
2620 Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2388 Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle]
3354 You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2387 How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
6649 Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe]