Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Chomsky on himself', 'The Principles of Chemistry' and 'Reference and Necessity'

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16 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16396 Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
6649 Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
17402 Mendeleev saw three principles in nature: matter, force and spirit (where the latter seems to be essence) [Mendeleev, by Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
17399 Elements don't survive in compounds, but the 'substance' of the element does [Mendeleev]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
17400 Mendeleev focused on abstract elements, not simple substances, so he got to their essence [Mendeleev, by Scerri]
17401 Mendeleev had a view of elements which allowed him to overlook some conflicting observations [Mendeleev]